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Abstract—Nowadays it is easy to track web users among websites:
cookies, web bugs or browser fingerprints are very useful techniques
to achieve this. The data collected can be used to derive a specific
user profile. This information can be used by third parties to present
personalized advertisements while surfing the web.
In addition a potential attacker could monitor all web traffic of an
user e.g. its search queries. As a conclusion the attacker knows the
intentions of the web user and of the company he is working for. As
competitors maybe very interested in such information, this could lead
to a new form of industrial espionage.
In this paper I present some of the techniques commonly used. I
illustrate some problems caused by the usage of insecure transmission
lines and compromised search engines. Some camouflage techniques
presented may help to protect the web users identity.
This paper is a based on the lecture “Secure Systems” teached by
Professor Walter Kriha at the Media University (HdM) Stuttgart.
Index Terms—secure search, search engine, client tracking, browser,
cookies, web bug, geotargeting, IPv6, fingerprint, SSL, secure sockets
layer, TLS, transport layer security, Tor Project, Startingpage, Fire-
fox, NoScript, BetterPrivacy, Ghostery, GoogleSharing, HTTPS Every-
where, Ref Control
1 INTRODUCTION
In professional IT environments people are used towork in a multi level security zone system. This kind
of security system allows an exact configuration for user
authorization and access. Areas with secure content or
client / server machines can be protected very well.
Increases in network interconnectivity requires systems
to be protected against connections from the network.
This can be solved relatively easy in an Intranet. If
you have in addition access from your Intranet to
the Internet you must also protect your inner systems
against the Internet. To accomplish this you can set
up a proxy or firewall server to route all traffic to the
Internet. There are well known concepts to solve these
issues. Figure 1 gives an example DMZ1 system setup
as advised by the BSI [2].
Nowadays most enterprise systems are rather secure
(with some exceptions ... [3, 4, 5, 6]). A bigger security
risk since decades is induced by the human beens
themselves with their short comings: short passwords,
passwords saved in a text file on the desktop, insecure
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1. Demilitarized Zone, see [1]
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Fig. 1: example architecture – DMZ network with two fire-
walls
USB sticks, installation of insecure third party software,
and so on ... these are only a few examples.
Study [7] about industrial espionage in the German
economy proofs that theory. 18.9 % of the surveyed
companies had already an industrial espionage. In
35.1 % of the cases there was a unconfirmed suspicion
of industrial espionage. It turned out that 24 % of the
offenders were employees of the companies themselves!
Economic uncertainty, job losses, rising job pressure,
and lack of appreciation of an employee may be the
cause of industrial espionage and the runoff from busi-
ness critical information.
Loyalty towards the employer is no longer taken
for granted today. In some cases loss of pay is
compensated with suplementary income. With
modern communication media, it is prettey easy to
pass sensitive data to well-paying recipients
without being noticed by the company.
— [7, p. 25 (translated)]
Some employees are willing to harm their employer
by selling sensible data to third parties. Another prob-
lem for loss of information is headhunting. A com-
petitor could make a better salary offer and entice the
employee away from its company. This happens with a
probability of 18.1 %.
Hacker attacks against the IT as a reason of infor-
mation loss are only listed at the third position with a
percentage of 14.9 %.
64 % of all harmed companies had a financial loss
between e 10 000 and e 1 million per liability case. Some
companies (7.2 %) admit that they suffered a loss from
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over e 1 million! Extrapolating these numbers for about
65 000 German companies, they [7, page 17] had come
to an amount of loss of about e 2 800 million per year.
The total loss is probably much higher, because they
did not consider small business in their study.
Nowadays, I believe that there is a new form of
industrial espionage. Web users are using search en-
gines to query all kind of stuff without being aware
what may happen at the background. Using some tricky
techniques a user’s company and his intentions can be
identified. If a web user has an important position in
a company for instance in management, research, or
development, an attacker or spy of another company
could gain advantage by observing the users web traffic.
The crux is, a search engine can see which search term
the user is querying for and find out the user’s location
(e.g. country, city, company, research facility, university,
...). Also it is possible to determine a rarely used and
unique search term. In addition the user’s trace can also
be tracked and logged over a lot of websites. Combining
this information together, the search term, the user’s
location or company, and some websites the user was
on, a profile about the user and the intentions of its
company can be derived easily. If in addition the user
is logged on at the search engine for supplemental
services, it is much easier to get extra information.
In case the provider of the search engine has an evil
intention e.g. interests to sell the information and the
drawn conclusions to third parties, this may lead to a
new form of industrial espionage! Nobody knows for
sure if this isn’t already happening...
This scenario with the risk of an information theft
can be achieved by the provider of a search engine (see
Figure 2) or also in some ways by a man-in-the-middle
attack (see Figure 3).
search engine 
client 
evil third parties 
information runoff 
/ sell information 
Fig. 2: information runoff by a search engine
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Fig. 3: man-in-the-middle attack
Some commonly used methods and techniques to
track and monitor web site users are described in sec-
tion 2. In section 3 I describe methods to protect Internet
access against third parties and camouflage techniques
for search queries.
2 TRACKING CLIENTS
An important issue on the web is that everybody is
trackable in some ways. In the past users could be
tracked easily with cookies. Nowadays, cookies are less
used, because of restricted browser settings, growing
awareness among users, and better web browser pri-
vacy controls. However, tracking is still possible with
other methods like web bugs, fingerprints, or geotar-
geting. In the following subsections I will explain them
in detail.
2.1 Cookies
The first specification of cookies was
released in 1994. Since then cookies were
used for useful things like sessions, but
also for advertisements or persistent data
storage at the client. A persistent cookie
has a long expiration time. Such a cookie will be trans-
ferred each time the user requests content from that
domain again.
An advertiser can track users over a lot of websites
just by including advertisements into the website. While
loading the advertisement a cookie with a random
string will be stored at the client. On other websites ad-
vertisements from the same domain could be included.
In this case the client will send his existing cookie back
to the advertisment server. The server stores URL, date,
and cookie in a log file. With that information the server
(advertiser) can draw conclusions from the log file e.g.
who you are, where you are, what you are looking for,
what your interest are, to what social group you are
belonging to and so on...
The vast proliferation of Flash made sure that so-
called “Zombie-Cookies”, “Local Shared Objects” (LSO)
or “Flash Cookies” are increasingly gaining importance.
Zombie-Cookies are created by the Flash player and
stored in the file system; consequently the browser can
not delete them any more. If the users tries to delete
them, they usually will be recreated by the flash ap-
plication automatically. Firefox has an extension called
“BetterPrivacy” (see 3.3.2) which is able to automati-
cally detect and delete such cookies.
Peter Eckersley states in [8] that “There is growing
awareness among web users that HTTP cookies are a
serious threat to privacy, and many people now block,
limit or periodically delete them”. Cookies and the
traceability by third parties can be limited by disabling
“third-party cookies” in the browser or by using a
browser extension such as BetterPrivacy.
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2.2 Web Bug alias Tracking Pixel
“Web Bug” is an synonym for a 1x1 blank tracking
pixel [9]. These 1x1 pixels (usually PNG or GIF images)
are included in a website or an HTML e-mail. While
requesting the external image, the browser (or e-mail
application) sends also some additional information to
the server: the IP address of the requester, what kind
of browser the requester has, the operating system,
the requesting time, and a corresponding cookie (if
available) of the same domain.
Therefore, third parties are able to check if an HTML
e-mail was received, opened and potentially read. Web
users can also be tracked and monitored among web
sites. This technique is interesting for an advertiser as he
is able to present personalized and invasive advertise-
ments to the web user. They can also draw conclusions
about relationships of products, websites, users, ethnic
groups, etc.. A movement profile can be easily created
from this data.
Some web bugs do not even require a cookie. It is
possible to append information to a request without the
usage of a cookie. If you want to know whether your
spam e-mail has reached its target, you can insert a web
bug and append the e-mail address of your target to the
1x1 pixel URL’s end.
For example: the targets e-mail address is foo@barC
.baz and the URL of the web bug http://my-C
server.foo/web-bug.gif. Combining this data
you receive an extended URL like this: http://my-C
server.foo/web-bug.gif?email=foo@bar.baz.
The URL extension ?email=foo@bar.baz is ignored
by the web server, but it’s logged in a log file. Later,
conclusions can be drawn easily by analysing the log
files.
As you can see, the usage of web bugs is easy.
Modern web bugs extend this functionality to other
kinds of external resources e.g. scripts, stylesheets, or
links. Blocking web bugs is not an easy thing to do
since external resources are an important component of
modern websites.
2.3 Geotargeting
Geotargeting [10] is a synonym for the
determination of a web site user’s ge-
ographical location to deliver different
location based content. The granularity of
location detection can be: country, region,
state, city, street, organization, IP address, or ISP2. This
technique is widely used for location based advertise-
ments, news, and for restriction of video content for
specific countries (e.g. legal or copyrights issues [11]).
Some web sites use geotargeting to identify the users
origin in order to present them the web site in their
native language and, for example, to adapt the currency
of a web shop.
Identification of the user’s location via IP address is
more or less the “old” way. As lots of people have
2. Internet Service Provider
a smartphone today, geographic identification of the
user’s location via GPRS or GPS is a “new” and more
accurate way. Therefore, default activation of a smart-
phone’s GPS module should be taken with care.
2.4 IPv6
In 2011 the last IPv4 addresses will be exhausted [12].
Therefore IPv6 was developed which supports a factor
of 296 more addresses then IPv4. Everyone could now
receive its own unique address. However, what does
this mean for the users and the future of privacy? [13,
14]
The first part of the IPv6 address (the so called
“prefix”) is given by the provider. If he is not willing
to change this prefix periodically, the user will be easily
tracked and identified over a long period of time. This
issue can become a serious privacy problem. The second
part of the address (the identifier) will be protected:
the “Privacy Extension” changes the interface identifier
randomly and guarantees that a device address of an
end device is not recognizable. An activation of this
feature on every new system and device by default
would be a good practice. Some new smartphones
already have IPv6 support on board; currently there is
no way to activate the “Privacy Extension” on some of
these devices [15]. By default the identifiers are changed
on those devices but in an inadequate manner.
Another concept of IPv6 is that every client in an
Intranet system (behind a firewall or proxy) can also
get its own IP address so no routers or NAT3 is needed.
These addresses can become visible in the Internet. This
is a useful feature, but it can cause privacy and integrity
problems particularly in big companies with a lot of
clients.
IPv4 has the advantage that the provider forces a
reconnection after a maximum of 24 hours. Therefore,
the web user receives a new IP address every 24 hours
latest. However, this feature will be abolished in regard
to the article [16]. With IPv6 there will probably be
no forced reconnection by the provider any more (only
against some extra bucks!).
If the privacy will not be well-respected with IPv6,
there will probably be no more anonymous users. ISPs
or even governments would be able to accurately iden-
tify or track online users. Welcome surveillance society!4
2.5 Browser Fingerprints
Nowadays it is easy to collect browser
information. For each server request it
appends e.g. the browser identification,
what operating system it is running on,
what rendering engine is used, and what
file formats the browser accepts. With
the help of JavaScript, Java, Flash or Sil-
verlight even more data of interest can be determined.
All this information combined yields something like a
unique fingerprint for the web browser used.
3. Network Address Translation
4. Please keep in mind: This is a theoretical / “academic” work and
should give you food for thoughts!
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Browser fingerprints are a serious issue and should
be taken with care. A team including Peter Eckersley
did a study [8] for the Electronic Frontier Foundation to
demonstrate how unique your web browser is in the
world wide web. They ran a test with two groups of
users: one group was conscious about privacy with spe-
cial settings to camouflage their browser. The “normal”
users had Adobe Flash or Java Virtual Machine as plu-
gins enabled. 83.6 % of the privacy conscious users had
a browser with an instantaneously unique fingerprint.
The Browsers of “normal” users with plugins enabled
showed an instantaneously unique fingerprint of 94.2 %
[8, p. 2].
At the project’s website http://panopticlick.eff.org/
you can test the uniqueness of your browser yourself. I
performed the test with my Android 3.0 Tablet, Firefox
5.0 on a desktop PC with default settings and with the
addon NoScript enabled. The browser on my Android
tablet and my Firefox 5.0 with default settings seems to
be unique among 1 675 384 tested browsers so far. Using
Firefox 5.0 with the addon NoScript (see 3.3.1) enabled,
only one in 16 425 had the same browser fingerprint.
Running this test on your own system should give you
some food for thoughts.
As a tracking mechanism for use against people
who limit cookies, fingerprinting also has the
insidious property that it may be much harder for
investigators to detect than supercookie methods,
since it leaves no persistent evidence of tagging on
the user’s computer.
— [8, p. 3]
A fingerprint with a wide diversity among others
could be used as an “global identifier”, because of its
uniqueness. According to Eckersley a browser finger-
print can not easily be deleted such as a cookie. It
requires major changes in browser settings to alter the
fingerprint. A combination of browser fingerprints with
the previously illustrated tracking methods may result
in a serious threat regarding the user’s privacy in the
Internet.
Policymakers should start treating fingerprintable
records as potentially personally identifiable [...]
— [8, p. 16]
3 CAMOUFLAGE
A secure browsing experience can only be established
by drawing a curtain over the requests or by cam-
ouflaging the user’s browser. Some improvements can
be achieved by changing the browser settings e.g. de-
activate third party cookies. Some camouflage tech-
niques requires specific effort. One option is to mask a
browser’s fingerprint in order to reduce its uniqueness
in the internet (see 2.5). Another option is hiding your
IP address.
Camouflaging the browser is possible but not always
easy. In the following section I show some tools and
techniques to establish a more secure browsing experi-
ence.
3.1 Secure Connections
A good starting point to protect the
user (and his browser) against third par-
ties is the usage of a secure connection.
Nobody knows which route the pack-
ets between clients and servers take. Furthermore, the
packets’ route may change on every request and thus
it is not possible to predict the route and its security.
Proxys, routers, or other servers which route the packets
to their destination can be compromised. This causes
security issues regarding sensitive data e.g. credit card
information. Consequently, a secure line for the trans-
mission is required.
Today, you do not have to be in a high administrative
position to get something like a red cable telephone for
a secure transmission. Every browser since Netscape
has the capability to establish a secure connection via
SSL5 (or the newer TLS6). The Secure Sockets Layer was
designed as a separate protocol and therefore can be
added as an extra layer to the protocols’ architecture
(see Figure 4).
HTTP
&&
FTP

SMTP
xx
SSL

TCP

IP
Fig. 4: SSL in the OSI model
The message is routed by the Internet Protocol (IP).
Above is the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which
provides a reliable communication. At the top there
are application layer protocols e.g. HTTP7, FTP8 or
SMTP9. SSL can be put between application layer and
the regular transport layer. As a result, SSL is flexible
enough to be used universally for different application
layer protocols [17, p. 8].
There are also some disadvantages using SSL: first,
a SSL certificate to authenticate the server against the
client must be created and stored on a secure third
party authentication server. Some older browsers also
have a faulty behaviour if a SSL/TLS mode is not
available: the browser switches back to a prior SSL/TLS
5. Secure Sockets Layer
6. Transport Layer Security
7. Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
8. File Transfer Protocol
9. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
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version with bugs or may even use a non secure
transmission without SSL. It is important to check the
browser settings such that a non supported SSL/TLS
connection is rejected instead of switching back to a
non encrypted one. Another problem is that the server
and client load rises due to extra SSL handshakes and
(de-) compression of the data. Due to faster computers
and networks this issue can be neglected nowadays.
Always keep in mind: a secure connection can only
be established if the server offers one!
3.2 Using A Proxy
A server between two end-devices which forwards or
filters data is called a proxy. This proxy can be config-
ured to be transparent for end-devices. This allows to
mask a end user client from a web server or a search
engine. Setting up and configuring a proxy server is
not an easy thing, hence I introduce two public proxy
systems as examples. A third exemplary proxy system
is introduced as a Firefox extension in 3.3.4 “Google-
Sharing”.
3.2.1 Tor Project
“Tor”10 is a network to make the connection data
anonymous. The service is based on the “onion rout-
ing” [19] principle. A message is encrypted repeatedly
on consecutive network nodes (the message is wrapped
in encrypted layers comparable to an onion skin). Each
node only knows the previous and next nodes. There-
fore origin, destination and content of the message is
masked for the routing nodes.
The connection between two clients is always routed
over three randomly chosen Tor nodes. The route is
used for a period of time; afterwards new nodes are
randomly chosen again. This guarantees that a route
changes periodically and thus is not easily reproducible.
The entry and exit nodes in a chain of network nodes
are most vulnerable; attackers can take over those nodes
and thereby de-anonymize the messages. Therefore Tor
does not use dynamically chosen entry nodes. The entry
nodes – called “entry guards” – are chosen by the client
from a list of well known entry nodes with a high
transfer rate and a high availability.
The last part of the connection between the Tor exit
node and the destination can be insecure and monitored
by attackers. It is advised to use a secure connection via
SSL/TSL between the source and destination over the
Tor network.
TorButton has evolved to give considerable
thought to fingerprint resistance and may be
receiving the levels of scrutiny necessary to
succeed in that project.
— [8, p. 14]
10. The Onion Routing, see [18]
Tor is a useful service to anonymize the web traffic
and hide the users’ IP address, but it should be self-
evident to use it with care. Oneself’s behaviour must
be adapted to some rules to achieve a high anonymity
in the Internet.
A bundle11 including the Tor software and a pre-
configured web browser helps to get started with Tor
easily. There are also some additional packages and
tools for more experienced users.
3.2.2 Startingpage
“Startingpage” [20] is an extended secure version of
Googles’ search engine. It offers a proxy that relays the
original search request to Google, draws a curtain over
the search request and strips off all client identification
information. As no identification information and IP
addresses are saved this allows an anonymous search
experience.
The provider of Startingpage “Ixquick” has been cer-
tified by EuroPriSe, a privacy initiative by the European
Union. Ixquick offers the first and officially certified
secure search engine.
The Startingpage service is available as a website with
a Google-like appearance, or as a search engine entry
in the Firefox browser search bar.
3.3 Browser Extensions
Browser extensions can be used to protect the user
against threats from the Internet. The following exten-
sions are examples for the Mozilla-based web browser
Firefox. There are similar extensions for other modern
browsers.
3.3.1 NoScript
NoScript [21] is a free extension for the web browser
Firefox or other Mozilla-based browsers. This addon
allows the execution of trusted active site elements
e.g. JavaScript, Java, Flash, Silverlight or other plugins
based on a whitelist. By default all non-known active
site elements are blocked. This feature reduces security
issues, masks the browsers fingerprint and decreases its
uniqueness (see subsection 2.5). In addition it has also
a powerful Anti-XSS12 protection.
Since its start in 2005, NoScript has become a famous
extensions for Firefox. It is a good advice to use NoScript
to achieve a more secure browsing experience.
NoScript is a useful privacy enhancing technology
that seems to reduce fingerprintability.
— [8, p. 14]
11. https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html
12. Cross-site scripting
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3.3.2 BetterPrivacy
BetterPrivacy [22] is another Firefox extension to protect
the user’s browser against undeletable cookies – so
called “Zombie-Cookies” (see subsection 2.1). For exam-
ple flash cookies are stored in a system folder and thus
protected against deletion by the browser. BetterPrivacy
can detect these cookies and delete them. Normally
the user won’t even notice the extension: cookies are
deleted either timer controlled or at browser shutdown.
Newer Firefox versions have this functionality already
built in. This feature reduces the trackability by third
parties.
3.3.3 Ghostery
Ghostery [23] is able to detect web bugs (see subsec-
tion 2.2), tracking cookies (see subsection 2.1), and other
kinds of tracking tools included into the current loaded
website. The extension has a list with a lot of known ad-
vertisement and tracking web bugs or cookies in order
to block and stop them from being loaded. If tracking
content is recognized, the user will be informed by a
small bubble in the browser’s window. This extension
is useful to protect the user’s privacy and trackability
against third party web bugs, but this extension is only
as good as the included blacklist by the programmers.
3.3.4 GoogleSharing
A search engine may become a serious threat to a user’s
privacy as described in section 1 and shown in Figure 2.
It is essential to protect the end-user, its search terms,
and intentions against the search engine. “GoogleSharing
is a system that mixes the requests of many different
users together, such that Google is not capable of telling
what is coming from whom.” [24]. Therefore the proxy
generates a pool of identities of known user-agents and
uses one of them to relay the search request to the
search engine. The original request is stripped off from
all client identifying information by the proxy.
GoogleSharing is a special kind of anonymizing
proxy service, designed for a very specific threat. It
ultimately aims to provide a level of anonymity
that will prevent Google from tracking your
searches, movements, and what websites you visit.
— [24]
This extension captures the actual query and for-
wards the request through a proxy to the original server.
Normally the user doesn’t even notice that his request
has been forwarded. The actual search flow is not
interrupted, but only extended by a security feature.
3.3.5 HTTPS Everywhere
Today, many websites offer limited HTTPS 13 sup-
port. Links, scripts and other data in those pages are
13. Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure – HTTP over SSL/TSL,
see subsection 3.1
included with mixed protocols (HTTP, HTTPS). The
Firefox extension HTTPS Everywhere [25] fixes this issue
by altering links etc. from known websites to a secure
connection over SSL/TSL if available in the extensions’
whitelist. The user can also write own rules for websites
not listed in the HTTPS Everywhere extension.
3.3.6 Ref Control
Browsing between different websites leaves tracks and
useful information for third parties. The evildoer in
this case is the so called “HTTP Referrer” sent by the
browser, which tells a website from where the user is
coming. It is easy to derive a user profile from this
information. Ref Control [26] is another useful Firefox
extension which can block HTTP Referrers by default.
The user can also define own rules and thereby create
a whitelists and blacklists for different websites.
4 CONCLUSION
The previous sections hopefully showed how serious
the tracking issues is. Harmless looking websites can
serve as information collecting and user tracking data
kraken. User profiles can be derived from this data and
sold for profit to well paying recipients. Sadly, this is
no science-fiction and already happening.
Therefore, the motto is: shields up! Today there are
a lot of known techniques (see section 3) and browser
extensions (see subsection 3.3) to protect the web user
and his traffic. The Firefox extension NoScript is use-
ful to block undesired external tracking and maybe
malicious scripts. An unintended side effect is that
NoScript reduces the browsers’ uniqueness and thus its
fingerprint (see subsection 2.5). Therefore, you should
install the NoScript extension. Initially, it may be a little
bit disturbing to create a whitelist, but it’s worth the
effort.
We identified only three groups of browser with
comparatively good resistance to fingerprinting:
those that block JavaScript, those that use
TorButton, and certain types of smartphone.
— [8, p. 16]
NoScript is adequate for a lot of users. In order to hide
your IP address from a search engine a proxy service
like Startingpage or GoogleSharing is required. However,
to mask your IP address and make your traffic com-
pletely anonymous a proxy service like the Tor Project
is more useful. If you feel insecure while searching, you
should use a proxy service or an extended secure search
engine like Startingpage.
For any kind of sensitive data e.g. personal informa-
tion, login, or banking data, make sure to use a secure
connection over SSL/TSL (see subsection 3.1). In Firefox
you can check this by clicking on the websites’ icon at
the left of the address bar.
Keep in mind: your system is only as secure as your
weakest member in the whole chain!
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